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MOTION 
No. 71-5103 OT 1971 
Morrissey v. Brewer, Warden 
APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Certiorari was granted in this case on December 20, 1971. The 
case will be argued later this Spring. Petr has filed this appli-
Don 
cation for appointment of counsel noting that W./Britton, Jr. of 
Des Moines, Iowa represented Petr before the CA 8 (he was appointed 
to represent Petr by that court). He argued and briefed the case 
before the Eight Circuit and handled the successful petition for 
cert in this Court. He has filed his application for admission 
to the Supreme Court. 
Unless the CJ has other counsel in mind, I would grant this 
application to appoint Mr. Britton. 
GRANT APPLICATION LAH 
Court Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19. ,. No. 71-5103 
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this Term and will be argued either late this Term or next 
Term. It raises the question of~ to a<fa"role revocat~ 
hearing. This amicus, James Russell, is a defendant in a 
case in the CA 7; he has raised the same claim in that Cir-
cuit and the CJ of that Circuit has ordered that no further 
action be taken in his case until the Supreme Court det!-f5)<:les 
this case. Russell has received the approval of all the 
parties, except one of the Petitioners. .s His congent has not 
been secured only because an attorney has not yet been appointed 
to represent him in his ffeliiiid hearing on the merits in this 
Court. Russell's attorneys appear to have done a competent 
job of #iii writing this brief. I would grant the motion to 
file. 
It should also be noted that, unlike most amicus briefs, 
--2--
this one is not printed. Russell has filed a motion to 
dispense with printing. Ordinarily I wonder about the 
propriety of putting this Court to the expense of reproducing 
9 copies of an amicus brief. The expense and effort hardly 
seem warranted in view of the little value such briefs serve. 
But, at least in this case, the brief has already been dupli-
cated by the clerk's office in order that each Justice could 
pass on the motion. At this point, it appears fruitless to 
question whether this brief should have been printed. Maybe 
the Court has a policy of allowing the filing of unprinted 
amicus briefs. 
GRANT LAH 
- ....... . . 
Court ................... . 
Argued ................... , .19 .. . 
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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BENCH MEMO 
No. 71-5103 MORRISSEY v. BREWER, WARDEN 
This case ( cert from 8th Circuit 4 to 3 decision) involves as its sole 
issue whether a parolee is entitled to due process rights before his parole 
~ -<?.-;C~ ,J ~~~ - ?Jl./+i ~ 
may be revoked. v I , 1 ~ _ 
2. (.p - 2- g-' ~  ~ ~ KM_ 
-:::::- ~ a-/ ~~ - ~ f- iL-o 
Majority Opinion ( Chief Judge Matthes) ~ a...c:, ~ i.A..J ~ -.lt..r 
'Pa-ro-(. ~L ~ '2... 7. 
The Iowa procedure with respect to paroles is as follows: There is 
a three-member parole board, with power to grant and revoke parole. Once 
an inmate is placed on parole, he is under the supervision of the director of 
corrections, but "remains in the legal custody of the warden." The Iowa 
Code provides that "all paroled prisoners are subject at any time to be 
taken into custody and returned to the institution from which they were 
paroled." There is no requirement for notice or hearing. 
The Iowa Supreme Court has construed its statutes as follows: 
"The Iowa statutes do not provide for such a hearing before 
the parole board. The board is given no power to issue 
subpoenas nor swear witnesses. . . . It is an administrative 
2. 
function rather than judicial." (A. 123) 
In 1965 the 8th Circuit approved the procedure followed in Iowa, 
and expressly held as follows: 
"A parole is a matter of grace, not a vested right. A large 
discretion is left to the states as to the manner and terms 
upon which paroles may be granted and revoked. Federal 
due• process does not require that a parole revocation be 
predicated upon notice and opportunity to be heard. " 
(A 124). 
Conflict with 7th Circuit In Han v. Burke, 430 F. 2d 100, (1970), 
the 7th Circuit - following Goldber gv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, held that due 
process applies at least to the extent of a Goldberg type hearing. (In 
Goldberg the Court held that notice and hearing are necessary, but that the 
hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi judicial trial. The 
welfare recipient must have an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses 
and to present his own arguments and evidence orally before an impartial 
decision maker, with counsel if he so desires - although the state need not 
provide counsel.) 
But the majority in this case (Morrissey v. Brewer) did not think 
Goldberg to be controlling - a welfare recipient being entitled to specified 
rights under a statute, as contrasted with a parolee who is still serving a 
prison sentence. 
The Court's analysis of the status of parole is as follows: 
"Parole relates to an administrative action taken after the 
convict has served a portion of his sentence behind prison 
wallf It is not a suspension of sentence, but a 'substitution 
during the continuance of the parole, of a lower grade of 
punishment, by confinement in the legal custody and under 
the control of the warden within specified prison mc:EIHlUix 
bounds outside the prison, for the confinement within the 
prison adjudged by the court. '. . • Parole does not end or 
3. 
in any way affect a prisoner's sentence, but is a correctional 
device authorizing service of sentence outside the penitentiary. " 
(A. 126-27) 
The Court distinguished Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) on the 
ground that "probation" is presentencing, and revocation of probation is 
"a stage in the criminal proceedings. " Such proceedings had ended, however, 
when one is sentenced to prison. Thereafter, no criminal proceedings is 
involved. 
Dissenting Opinion : 
~ 
A strong dissent by Judge Lay (joined Heaney and Bright) argues in 
" 
favor of certain limited due process rights, relying primarily on Goldberg. 
The minority opinion takes up each one of the majority's arguments and 
answers it fairly well. 
I was also impressed by the minority's argument that several states 
do prescribe hearings on revocation of parole, and that no great problems 
have resulted. ( A. 142) 
The minority reasons that this Court has held that prisoners have 
constitutional rights. See Cooper v. Pate, 370 U. S. 546; Johnson v. AorHxg 
• Avery, 393 U. S. 483. The minority also cites the recent Second Circuit 
4. 
opinion by Judge Kaufman in in Sostre v. McGinnis, F. 2d 
( February 24, 1971), where certain "minimal" due process rights were 
accorded a prisoner with respect to solitary confinement. It is not difficult, 
as a matter of logic, to reason that if confined prisoners have some due process 
rights, those on parole also have such rights. The difficult question relates 
to when and under what circumstances do a prisoner's rights reach the point 
of requiring notice, hearing, confrontation with witnesses and the like. 
. - . 
--
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§J.tVTtmt ~cm-t cf t!rt ~ttlttb ;§mttg 
'Jl!TN:glp:ngfott, J. ~. 2llffe'l-' 
June 12, 1972 
No. 71-5103 -- Morrissey v. Brewer 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is proposed opinion. 
Please note that the "tentative" idea I mentioned at 
Conference has now "ripened" into a procedural step 
in terms of the "preliminary hearing." The experience 
under Hyser v. Reed for the Federal system, with a 







JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~u:vuim <qcud cf tltt ~ttitt~ ~fl:tftg 
'llallfyhtgfott, J. <q. 211.;i'~J 
June 14, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5103 - Morrissey v. Brewer 
Dear Chief: 
Subject to what others may have in mind, 
I join your opinion in this case, with the sug-
gestion, however, that you eliminate or modify 
the last sentence of footnote 17 in view of the 
fact that the circuits are in conflict on the 
question and we once granted a case to decide 
the issue. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 





v' ""1,.t. y ~~,CAJ ,...,_...-,-~ ~ ~ 
Aoowat-a.,·.-e,i .. ~~? 
~ L ~ t.Q )(' - .-.,,Gd. •~ -
MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL , ~ ~ ~ 
Rea No. 71-5103, Morrissey y. Brewer-~~~ ,y« "f '-f-- f-o 
~~¢J.J..--'-'.. 
This is the case which presents t~at 
due process requires prior to parole revocation. 
The CJ has circulated an opinion for the Court, which 
holds that due process requires, 
(1) a minimal hearing before an independent officer 
at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole viol~tion, 
as promptly as convenient after arresto The object of this 
"minimal" hearing is to determine whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the parolee has committed acts which 
would constitute a violation of parole conditions. 
(2) a plenary hearing, if desired by the parolee, 
prior to the final decision on revocation by the parole 
authority, This hearing is the final evaluation of any 
)
contested relevant facts. The parolee must have an opportunity 
to be heard, although he need not have an opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
WOD has circulated an opinion Which goes farther in sev" 
eral respects. WOD would require, in additions 
'I (1) the right to the assistance of counsel 
• (2) the right to confront adverse witnesses 
(3) a parolee cannot be arrested unless the alleged 
violation of parole is either a new criminal offense or 
attempted flight. That is, for mere 11 technical" violations 
., 
-2-
(e.g., drinking, etc,), there should be notice and a hearing 
before arrest, 
It appears that several other members of the Court may 
join WOD. I also understand that several members of the 
? 
Court hav.re made suggestions to the CJ regarding changes 
in his opinion, Which is not (as I understand and gather 
from his memo) exactly what the Conference decided, 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
;$u:pnmt (ijourt of tlrt 'J[tnitt~ .:§tattg 
~a~dringfott. gl. QJ. 2.ll.;iJ-!.~ 
June 15, 1972 
No. 71-5103 --Morrisseyv. Brewer 
Dear Byron: 
I have deleted the last sentence -- note 
page 17. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to Conference 
Dear Chief: 






~uµ ·tme <.q:om~ !lt tltt ~ttilth ~ hl:ua 
,irrudp:ngt!llt. :!B, Q}. 2.0ffe'li, 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5103 - Morrissey v. Brewer 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
.;J.O. t1. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
I" 
' J, 
' .- ,, 
'• 
C HA""1BE:RS Of" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,Bttpttutt {401Ui it{ tlf t ~~ ittatt• 
-ulftttg~ J. QI. 2lt.;i,., 
June 20, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5103 - Morrissey and Booher v. Brewer 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/Al~ 
The Chief Justice 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.§1q.n:rn1r '1;ct1ti-t Ltf tlrr i1ttitc~ .§tufrs 
in.1!;'i[1iagton, p. <q. 20~1~J 
June 22, 1972 
71-5103 - Morrissey v. Warden 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion as recircu-
lated today, with the understanding reached at 
our Conference that the last full paragraph on 
page 18 and its footnotes will be deleted or 
substantially modified. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
\ \. l a, 
THE C. J . W. 0. D . W. J . B. P. S. B. R. W. T . M. H. A. B. L. F . P. W. H. R. 
5/ 8/ 72 . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
~o':: • Jfmrtt ee Douglas 
Mir. Jruzt., ee Brennan ,/ 
Jfr'. Jwst c Stewart 
I.fr. Juet ce :J'hi te 
Mr. Just.ice rshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
TAT~e l-sl.U,.J. J ~s tlce 
Circulated: JUN 1 2 1972 
No. 71-5103 
Reoiroulated: _ _,_ ___ _ 
John J. Morrissey and G. Donald On Writ of Certiorari 
Booher, Petitioners, to the United States 
V. 
Lou B. Brewer, Warden, et al. 
r June -, 1972] 
Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm1on 
of the Court. ;-J ... 
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether /~ 4ce1C, ._, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment e:;:_ ~ ~ ~-
requires that a State afford an individual some oppor- • ..,.,. ~ 
tunity to be heard prior to revoking his parole. A" _ _A _-,--
Petitioner Morrissey was convicted of false drawing 6«4:<4'11',,,~ 
• 
or uttering of checks in 1967 pursuant to his guilty plea, ~ ~ ~
and was sentenced to not more than seven years' con- - I 
finement. He was paroled from the Iowa State Peni- tA,..,/a . C Js 
tentiary in June 1968. Seven months later, at the di- > ., • 
rection of his parole officer, he was arrested in his home 
town as a parole violator and incarcerated in the county 
jail. One week later, after review of the parole officer's 
written report, the Iowa Board of Parole revoked Mor-
rissey's parole and he was returned to the penitentiary 
located about 100 miles from his home. Petitioner as-
serts he received no hearing prior to revocation of his 
pa.role. 
The parole officer's report on which the Board of 
Parole acted shows that petitioner's parole was revoked 
on the basis of information that he had violated the 
conditions of parole by buying a car under an assumed 
name and operating it without permission, giving false 
statements to police concerning his address and insur-
71-5103-0.PINION 
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ance company after a minor accident, and obtaining 
credit under an assumed name and failing to report his 
place of residence to his parole officer. The report states 
tlrn.t the officer interviewed Morrissey, and that he could 
not explain " ·hy he did not contact his parole officer 
despite his effort to excuse this on the ground that he 
had been sick. Further, the report asserts that Mor-
rissey admitted buying the car and obtaining credit 
under an assumed name a.nd als-o admitted being in-
volved in the accident. The parole officer recommended 
that his parole be revoked because of "his continual 
violating of his parole rules." 
The situation as to pet,itioner Booher is much the 
same. Pursuant to his guilty plea, Booher was con-
victed of forgery in 1966 and sentenced to a rna.xirnum 
term of 10 years. He was paroled November 14, 10G8. 
In August 1969, at his parole officer's direction, he was 
arrested in his home town for a violation of his parole 
and confined in the county jail several miles away. On 
September 13, 1969, on the basis of a written report 
by his parole officer, the Io,va Boa.rd of Parole revoked 
Booher's pa.role and Booher was recommitted to the 
state penitentiary, located about 250 miles from his 
home, to complete service of his sentence. Petitioner 
asserts he received no hearing prior to revocation of his 
parole. 
The parole officer's report with respect to Booher 
recommended that his pa.role be revoked because he had 
violated the territorial restrictions of his parole without 
consent, had obtained a driver's license under an assumed 
name and operated a motor vehicle without permission, 
and had violated the employment condition of his parole 
by failing to keep himself in gainful employment. The 
report stated that the officer had interviewed Booher 
and that he had acknowledged to the parole officer that 
he had left the specified territorial limits and had oper-
, . . ,
71-510:l-OPINION 
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atecl the car and had obta.ined a license under an as-
sumed name "knowing that it was wrong." The report 
further noted that Booher had stated that he had not 
found employment because he could not find work that 
would pay him what he wanted- he stated he would 
11ot work for $2.25 to $2.75 per hour- a.nd that he had 
left the area to get work in another city. 
After exhausting state remedies, both petitioners filed I 
habeas cor) )Ctitions in the United States District 
ourt for the Southern District of Iowa alleging that 
they liacl been denied due process because their paroles 
had been rcvoke~1thout a hearing. The Sta.te re-
sponded by argurng that no hearing was required. The r 
District Court held on the basis of controlling authority 
that the State's failure to accord a hearing prior to 
parole revocation did not violate due process. 
The Court of Appeals, dividing 4 to 3, held that due 
process docs not reqmrc a heanng. The majority rec-
ognized that the traditional view of parole as a priv-
ilege rather than a vested right is no longer dispositive 
as to whether due process is applicable; however, on a 
balancing of the competing interests involved, it con-
cl.!!_9ecl that no hearing is required. The court re~d 
that parole is only "a correctional device authorizing 
service of sentence outside the penitentiary"; the parolee 
is still "in custody." Accordingly, the Court of Ap-
peals was of the view that prison officials must have 
large discretion in making revocation determinations, 
and that courts should retain their traditional reluctance 
to interfere with disciplinary matters properly under 
the control of state prison authorities. The majority 
expressed the view that "non-legal, non-adversary con-
siderations" were often the determi11ative factor in mak-
ing a parole revocation decision. It expressed the fear 
that if adversary hearings were required for parole revo-
cation, "with the full panoply of rights accorded in 
71-510::l-OPINION 
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criminal proceedings," the function of the parole board 
as "an administrative body acting in the role of 7wrens 
JJatriae would be aborted" and the board would be more 
reluctant to grant parole in the first instance. Addi-
tionally, the majority reasoned that, the parolee has no 
statutory right to remain on parole. Iowa law pro-
vides he is subject to being returned to the institution 
at any time. Our holding in M empa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 
128 ( 1967), was distinguished ':on the ground that in 
involved deferred sentencing upon probation revocation, 
and thus involved a stage of the cr!i'i'imal proceeding, 
whereas parole revocation was not a stage in the crim-
inal proceedings. 
In its brief in this Court, the State asserts for the first 1 
time that petitioners were in fact granted hearings after 
they were returned to the penitentiar;- More genera.lly, 
the State says that within two months after the Board 
revokes an individual's parole and order him returned 
to the penitentiary, on the basis of the parole officer's 
written report, it grants the individual a hearing before 
the Board. At that time the Board goes over "each of 
the alleged parole violations with the returnee, and he 
is given an opportunity to orally present his side of 
the story to the Board." If the returnee denies the re-
port, it is the practice of the Board to conduct n, further 
investigation before making a final determination either 
affirming the initial revocation, modifying it, or revers-
ing it. 1 The State asserts that Morrissey, whose parole 
was revoked on January 31, 1969, was granted a hear-
ing before the Board on February 12, 1969. Booher's 
1 The hea.riui required b)· duo proccs,, ns tldinrtl hNrin, mu:,;t 
h r nccorclrd before the dfcrtini drcision. Srr Armstro11(! Y. Monza. 
3 0 U. S. 545 (1965). Petitionrr a"~Prt:-: hNr thal on!)· 0110 of the 
5-W rrvoratiom; ordered most rcrrntly by thr Imm Parole Board 
,1·aH rcver~ed aflcr hearing, Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 7, suggesting 
i-lial, tllC' hearing may nol ob,irrt.ivdy cvaluntc the rC'\'O('ntion cleei~ion . 
71-5103-OPINION 
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parole was revoked on September 13, 1969, and he was 
granted a hearing on October 14, 1969. At these hear-
ings, the State tells us-in the briefs-both Morrissey 
and Booher admitted the violations alleged in the parole 
violation reports. 
Nothing in the record supplied to this Court indicates 
that the State claimed, either in the District Court or 
the Court of Appeals, that petitioners had received hear-
ings promptly after their paroles were revoked, or that 
in such hearing they admitted the violations; that in-
formation comes to us <2,nly in the State's brief here. 
Further, even the assertions that the State makes here 
are not based on any public record but on interviews 
with two of the members of the parolo board. The 
interview relied on to show that petitioners admitted 
their violations did not indicate that the member could 
remember that in fact both Morrissey and Booher ad-
mitted the parole violations with which they were 
charged. He stated only that, according to his mem-
ory, in the previous several years all but three returnees 
had admitted commission of the parole infractions al-
leged and that neither of the petitioners was among 
the three who denied them. 
\Ve must therefore treat this case in the posture and I 
on the record the State elected to rely on in the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals. If the facts are other-
wise, the State may make a showing in the District 
Court that petitioners in fact have admitted the viola-
tions charged before a neutral officer. 
I 
Before reaching the issue of what is required by due-
process, it is important to have in mind a picture of 
the role of parole in this country. 
During the past 60 years,-the practice of releasing 
prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences 
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has become an integral part of the penologica1 system. 
Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Geo. 
L. J. 705 (1968). Rather than being an ad hoc exercise 
of clemency, parole is an established variation on im-
prisonment of convicted criminals. Its purpose is to 
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive 
individuals as soon as they are able to and without being 
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It 
also serves to alleviate the costs to society of kcepi11g 
an individual in prison." The essence of parole is re-
lease from prison, before the completion of sentence, 
on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules 
during the balance of the sentence. Under some sys-
tems parole is granted automatically after the service 
of a certain portion of a prison term. Under others, 
parole is granted by the discrctiona.ry action of a board 
which evaluates an array of information about a pris-
oner and undertakes a prediction whether he is ready 
to reintegrate into society. To accompfo,h the purpose 
of parole, those who arc a.Bowed to leave prison early 
are subjected to specified conditions for the duration of 
their terms. These conditions restrict their activities 
substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed 
by law on an individual citizen. Typically parolees 
arc forbidden to use liquor or to have associations or 
correspondence with certain categories of undesirable 
persons. Typically also they must, seek permission from 
their parole officers before engaging in specified activi-
ties, such as changing employment or living quarters, 
marrying, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, travel-
ing outside the community and incurring substa.ntial 
indebtedness. Additionally, pa.rolecs must regularly re-
" Rrr Warrrn .. Probn1ion in the Frdrr;d R)·~trm of Criminal .Ju~-
tier. 20 Frei. Prob. :~ (lfl.55); Anrni;tl Hrport , Ohio Ad11lt P:trole 
A11thoritr 19fl-l-/ G5. at 1::i-1-1-, Notr. P:1rolr: A Critiq11r of Tt~ Lrgal 
Fo1111dation~ and Condit.ion~. 38 N. Y. U. L. Re·\'. 702, 70G (IDG:1). 
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port to the parole officer to whom they are assigned and 
sometimes they must make periodic written reports of 
their activities. Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules, 
15 Crime and Delinquency 267, 272-273 (1969). 
The parole officers are part of the administrative sys-
tem designed to assist parolees and to offer them guid-
ance. The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; 
they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior 
which is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the 
individual into normal society. And through the re-
quirement of reporting to the parole officer and seeking 
guidance and perrnisi-ion before doing many things, the 
officer is provided with information about the parolee 
and an opportunity to advise him. The combination 
puts the parole officer into the position in which he can 
try to guide the parolee into constructive development.=i 
The enforcement leverage which supports the parol~ 
conditions derives from the authority to return the pa-
rolee to prison to serve out the balance of his sentence 
if he fails to abide by the rules. In practice not every 
violation of the conditions of parole automatically leads 
to revocation. Typically a parolee will be counseled 
to abide by the conditions of parole, and the parole 
officer ordinarily does not take steps to have parole re-
voked unless he thinks that the violations are serious 
and continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is 
not adjusting properly and cannot be counted on to 
avoid antisocial activity.1 The broad discretion accorded 
the parole officer is also inherent in some of the quite· 
vague conditions, such as the typical requirement that 
the parolee avoid "undesirable" associations or corre-
spondence. Cf. Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U. S. 4 
" Xotr, Ob~c1Tations on tllC' . \dmini~tra1ion of J':irolc, 7!) Ynl r-
L. ,T. 69S, 699-700 ( 1970). 
1 Ibid. 
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(Hl70). Yet revocation of parole is not an unusual 
phenomenon, affecting only a few parolees. It has been 
estimated that 35-45% of all parolees are rnbjected to 
revocation and return to prison.r. Sometimes revoca-
tion occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime; 
it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of 
the procedural case of recommitting the individual on 
the basis of a lesser showing by the State.n 
Implicit in the system of policing parole violations is 
the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty 
as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of 
his parole. The first part of a decision to revoke parole 
is thus a wholly retrospective factual question: whether 
the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more 
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that 
the parolee did violate the conditions does the second 
question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to 
prison or should other steps be taken to protect society 
aucl improve chances of rehabilitation. The second 
question involves the application of expertise by the 
parole authority in making a prediction as to the ability 
of the individual to live in society without commit-
ting antisocial acts. This part of the decision too de-
pends on facts, and therefore it is important for the 
Board to know not only that some violation was com-
mitted but also to know accurately how many and how 
serious the violations were. The decision of what to 
do with the parolee is not purely factual but also pre-
dictive and discretionary. 
" Prrsitlent 's Commission on La.w Enforcement and Administrn-
1 ion of ,Tu8ti ce, Correriio11s 62 . The substa ntial re\"Orat ion ra te 
ind icates t.hat parol e admi11islrafors oft en dcliberatcl)· rrr 011 t he 
~ido of granting parole in borderlin e cases. 
,; See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F, 2d 942, at 953-954, n. 5 (CA8 
1871) (Lay, J ., di~senting) ; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F. 2d 91_, 104 
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If a parolee is returned to prison, he often receives no, \ 
credit for the time "served" on parole.' 
II 
We begin with the proposition that the revocation l 
of parole is not part of a crimilJal prosecution and thus 
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a 
proceeding docs not apply to parole revocations. Cf. 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967). Parole arises 
after the end of the criminal prosecution, including im-
position of sentence. Supervision is not directly by the 
court but an administrative agency, which is some-
times an arm of the court and sometimes of the execu-
tive. Revocation deprives an individual not of the ab-
solute liberty every citizen is entitled to, but only of 
the conditional liberty properly dependent on observ-
ance of special parole restrictions. 
We turn therefore to the quest}on whether the re-
quirements of due process in general apply to parole· 
revocations. It has been said so often by this Court 
and others as not to require citation of authority that 
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands. As MR. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN has written recently, "This Court \ 
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn 
upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized 
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U. S. 365, 374. Whether an roccdural protections \ 
ar:e due de ends on the extent to w 1c an rn 1 ual 
w1 1 e condemned to suffer grievous oss. oint ii-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. M cDratli, 341 U. S. 123, 
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Gold-
7 Arlukc, A Summary of Parole Rulc:,-Thirtccn Year:,; Later, 15 
Crime and Delinquency 267, 271 (1969); Note, Parole Revoca1.ion 
in 1hc Fcdcrnl Sy8tcm, 56 Geo. L. J. 705, 733 (1968). 
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berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 154, 163 (1970). "fC]onsidera-
tion of what procedures due process may require under 
any given set of circumstances must begin ,vith a deter-
mination of the precise nature of the governmental func-
tion involved as well as of the private interest that has 
been affected by governmental action." Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Union v. M cElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 
895 (1961). The question is not merely the "weight" 
of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of I 
the interest is one within the contemplation of the 
"liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Applying these standards to the revocation of parole, I 
we conclude that revocation of an individual's parole 
status calls for certam procedures, the general nature 
of which arc hereafter describea. 
The State's interests are several. The State has found 
the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That 
finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the 
individual's liberty. Release of the parolee before the 
end of his prison sentence is made with the recognition 
that ,vith many prisoners there is a risk that they will 
not be able to live in society without committing addi-
tional antisocial acts. Given the previous conviction 
and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has 
an overwhelming interest in being able to return the 
individual to imprisonment without the burden of a 
new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to 
abide by the conditions of his parole. 
Most of the States have recognized that there is no f 
interest on the part of the State in revoking parole 
without some procedural guarantees.; 
Although the parolee is often formally described as 
being "in custody," the argument cannot even be made 
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here that summary treatment is necessary as it may 
be with respect to controlli11g a large group of poten-
tially disruptive prisoners in actual custody. Nor are 
,rn persuaded by the argument that revocation is so 
totally a discretionary matter that some form of hear-
ing would be administratively intolerable. The discre-( 
tionary aspect of revocation should never be reached 
unless there is first an appropriate determination that 
the individual has in fact breached the conditions of 
parole. A simple factual hearing will not interfere with 
the exercise of discretion. Serious studies have suggested 
that fair treatment on parole revocation will contribute 
to the rehabilitative prospects and not result in fewer 
grants of parole." 
The parolee, of course, has a great interest involved 
in his potential revocation. He is at liberty. Though 
the State properly subjects him to many restrictions 
not applicable to other citizens, his liberty is very dif- I 
ferent from the condition of confinement in a prison.10 
The parolee probably has reestablished some of his ties 
on the outside of prison and at least has begun to re-
integrate himself into normal life. He may have been 
enjoying this conditional liberty for a number of years 
and may be living a relatively normal life at the time 
'' 8C'c PrC'1<idC'nt.'~ Comm'n on L:1\I' FnforcrmC'nt :ind Admini~trntion 
of .TustirC', T:i~k ForcC' RC'porl: CorrC'ction~ s:~ . 88 (l!JG7): Sklar, 
Lnw and Practice' in Probation and PnrolC' llC'Yocntion HC'nrinir.-, 
.'iii .T. Crim. L., and P. 8. 175, 194 (HJG-1) (110 dC'rrC'a~C' in l\firhil?;fl11 , 
\l'hirh gr:mts C'Xtl'JJf(iYC' righ1~): Rose v. Ilas!.-ins, 388 F. 2d !H, 102 
11. 16 (CAG 1968) (CelPbn'zzr, .T. . cli~"e11ti11g) (ro~t of irnprisonnwnt. 
,.:o much irreatrr thn11 cost of pnrolC' S)',.:1cm that procC'<lurnl l'C'(]1lirc-
ment,~ will not change economic motinttion). 
10 "H i~ not ~ophiRtir t.o a1tnrh grrat,er importance to n prr~on'~ 
.iu"tifi:ihle reliance in mai11tni11ing hi" eondition:11 freedom 1,0 long as 
hr nbidC',- b)· the condition!'( of hi,- relrm,e, than lo hi:,: merC' antiripn-
1 ion or hope of frrC'dom." Bey Y. Connecticut Del. of l'arole, 4-!3 
F. 2d 10i9, lOSG (CA2 1971). 
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he is faced with revocation. 11 Release on parole must 
be seen as including at least an implicit promise that 
parole will not be revoked unless the parolee fails to 
live up to these comlitions. In many cases the parolee 
faces lengthy incarceration if his parole is revoked. Ad-
ditionally, the revocation of parole puts an additional 
and serious blot on a man's record. The parolee's in- \ \ 
terest must be seen as included within the scope of the 
"liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III 
The question remains what g.r~S:s is due. Not every 
proceeding need be attended by s e rigia abstract pro-
cedural formula. Due process is not an all-or-nothing 
concept.12 
-fhere are two stages in the process of parole revoca-
tion that are important. The first occurs when the 
parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direc-
tion of his parole officer. The second is when parole 
is formally revoked. There is typically a substantial 
time lag between the arrest and the eventual deter-
mination by the parole board whether parole should 
be revoked. Additionally, it may be that the parolee 
is arrested at a place distant from the state prison, to 
which he may be returned before the final decision is 
made concerning revocation. Given these factors, due j 
process would seem to require S'2,_me minimal hearing to 
be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the 
alleged parole violation and as promptly as convenient 
after arrest while information is fresh and rnurces are 
available. Cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F. 2d 225 (CADC 
11 See, e. g., Murray v. Page, 429 F. 2d 1359 (CA7 19i0) (pnrole 
revoked after eight years; 15 years remnining on originnl term). 
1
~ Sec K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.16, al 356-359 
(1970 Supp.) ("Fart-finding processes can be summn.ry or quick 
without being basicnll)· unfair."). 
,, 
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1963). Such an inquiry should be seen as in the nature 
of a "Preliminary hearing'' to determine whether there I 
is p.r_obable cause or "?easonable grounds to belive that 
the arrested parolee has committed acts which would 
constitute a violation of parole conditions. 
The determination of reasonable grounds should be 
made by someone not directly involved- in the case . .......,_ 
It woillcl be unfair to assume that an mdiv1dual par'crre 
officer does not conduct an interview with the parolee 
to confront him with the reasons for revocation before 
he recommends an arrest. It would also be unfair to 
assume that the parole officer bears hostility against 
the parolee which destroys his neutrality; realistically 
the failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his 
supervising officer.13 However, we need make no, as-
sumptions one way or the other to conclude that there 
should be an uninvolved person to make this prelim-
inary evaluation of the basis for believing the conditions ~ 
of parole have been violated. The officer directly in-
volved in making reconunendations cannot always have 
complete objectivity in evaluating them. 11 Goldberg v. 
Kelly found it unnecessary to impugn the motives of 
the caseworker to find a need for an independent 
decisionmaker. 
This independent officer need not be a judicial officer. 
Parole and parole revocation are matters properly han-
dled by nonjudicial administrative officers. In Gold-
berg, the Court pointedly did not require that the hearing 
" ' Note, Ol>~crva1ions on the Admin. of Parole. 79 Yale L. J. 
GOS, 704-706 (1970) (parole officers in Connecticut adopt role 
modol of ~ocial worker rathC'!' than an adjunct of police, ai1d exhibit 
ts la.ck of punitive orientation). 
11 This is not an is ue limited to bad motivnt ion. "l'arolc agents 
arc human . aud it is po~:-ible that friction helwern the agC'nl :rnd 
1ho parolee may h:we i11flucncC'<l the agent'::; judgment." 4 Attor-
ney General's Survey 011 Relen~e Procedure:- 24(\--2-17 ( l 980). 
71-5103--0 l'I~lON 
14 lVIORRTSSEY v. BREWETI 
on termination of benefits be before a judicial officer 
or even before the traditional "neutral and detached" 
officer; it required only that the hearing be conducted 
by some person other than one initially dealing "·ith 
the case. It will be sufficient, therefore, in the parole 
revoca.tion context if an evaluation of whether reason-
able cause exists to believe that conditions of parole have 
been violated is made by a parole officer other than 
the one who has made the report of parole violations 
or has recommended revocation. A State could cer-
tainly choose some other independent decisionmaker to 
to perform this preliminary function. 
With respect to the preliminary hearing before this 
officer, the parolee should be given notice that the hear-
ing will take place and that its purpose is to determine 
whether ere is probable cause to believe he has com-
mitted a parole v10 a 1011. 1 notice must state ,vhat 
parole violations have been a.llegecl. At the hearing 
the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; 
he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can 
give relevant information to the hearing officer. 
The h~ing officer shall have the duty of making a 
summary, or diges~ of what transpires at the hearing 
in terms of the responses of the parolee and the sub-
stance of the documents or evidence given in support 
of the parolee's position. Based on the information I 
before him, the officer should determine whether there 
is probable cause to hold the parolee for the final de-
cision of the parole board on revocation. Such a deter-
mination would be sufficient to warrant the parolee's 
continued detention and return to the state correctional 
institution pending the final decision. As in Goldberg, 
"tho decision-maker should state the reasons for his 
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on ... " 
but it should be remembered that this is not a final 
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determination calling for "formal findings of fa.ct or 
conclusions of law." 397 U. S., at 271. No interest 
would be served by formalism in this process. 
There must also be an opportunity for a hearing, if 1 
it is desired by the parolee, prior to the final decision 
on revocation by the parole authority. This hearing 
must be t asis for more than determining prob1inle 
cause; it must lead to a final eva uation of an contested 
rclevant fac s. e parolee must have an opportunity 
to be heard and to show, if he can, that ~t 
violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances 
in mitigation suggest the violation does not warrant 
revocation. 
We .gannot write a code o\&rocedure; that is the re-
sponsibility of each State. ost States have done so 
by legislation; others by judicial decision usually on due 
process grounds.'" Om task is limited to deciding the 
1 " Ver~· few S1atr~ pro,·idr no hraring; at, :di in parolr rrvoca-
1iorn,. Thirty 81:1tr~ prol'idr in their st:itut0~ thnt :1 p:1ro!C'0 shall 
1w0ini ~omr t~·pr of hearing;. S0r Ah. Cocl0 Tit. 42, § 12 (1951'): 
Ah-ka Stat;. § 3:u.j.220 (]%2): Ariz. Rrl'. Stat,,. ,\m1. § 31-417 
(1939); Ark. Stnts . Ann. § 43-2810 (19fi8); Dr!. Code Ann. Tit. 11, 
§ 43,52 (]9()4); Fla. State<. Ann. § 9-t7.23 (1) (1955): Ca. Coclr 
.'1.1111. § 77-519 (1965): JI:mnii Rrl'. 8tnk § 3:33-66 (Hlfi7); Idaho 
Code §§ 20-229, 20-229A (Hl70): Ill. Ann. Stats. c. 108, § 205 
(1970); Incl. Stnts. Ann.§ 13-lflll (HlfH); Kan. Stnt. Ann.§ 22-3721 
(1970); K~,. Rev. Stats. Ann. §§439.330 (l)(e) (1956), 439.430 (1) 
(1966); 439.440 (195fi): La. Rev. Stnt~. § 15:574.9 (1968); Me. Rev. 
Stnts. Ann. r. 34, § 1G75 (10(i9); ::\Td. Ann. Code, ArL. 41, § 117 
(1957); ::\Tirh. Comp. Lnws Ann. § 791.1-tO (n) (Hlf\8): Mi~H. Cod0 
Ann. § 400-1-1:1 (195G); l\Io. Ann. Rtnt:,. § 5-+9.16,5 (1967); :\font. 
Hrv. Coc!C' §§ 9-1-983~. 9-1-9835 (19,55): ~- H. Hel'. Stat~. Ann. 
§ 607:46 (1939); N. :i\I. St:1t;;. Ann. §-tl-17-2S (196:~); Con~. L:m, 
of X. Y. Correction Lnw § 212 (1970); 'N. D. Cent. Code 12-59-]5 
( 1963); Pa. Stats. Ann. Tit. 61, § 331.21 (1951), Tit. 61, § 331.2a 
(Hl57): TC'nn. Coclr § 40-361!) (1955); T0x:1i-i Code of Crim. Pror., 
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minimum requirements of due process. In our view, 
iliey mclude (a) notice of the ciaimed violations of .-. 
parole; (b) disclosure of the information against the 
parolee except when some unusual circumstance ca1ls 
for confidentiality ;TcT opportunity to be heard in person 
and to )resen witnesses and documentary evidence; 
( d) a "n~tral and cletachec 1earmg o y sue 1 as a 
traditional parole board, members of "·11ich need not 
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (e) a statement by I 
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole. Whether in a particular case fairness // 
requires that the parolee be allowec! to confront and 
cross-examme ad:'"verse witnesses 1s a uest10n to be deter-
mme y e earmg o cer m t 1e particu ar case. See 
Davis, Adiritnistrahve Law Treatise ¾ 7.16, at 356-357 
(1970 Supp.). We emphasize there is no thought to 
equate this process to a criminal prosecution; it is a 
narrow factfinding inquiry; the process should be flexible 
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, 
and other material that would not be admissible in an 
adversary criminal trial. 
(1968); Wash. R0v. Code §§ 9.95.120 1hrough 9.95.126 (19fi9); 
W. Va. Code § 62-12-19 (1059). D0cision · of stn10 rrn<l f.r<lcral 
rourts haYe required a number of otlwr S1at0~ to provide hrariugi. 
See Hutchinson v. Patterson, 267 F. Supp. 433 (Colo. 1967); United 
States ex rel. Bey v. Conn. Bd. Parole, 443 F. 2d 1079 (CA2 1971); 
Brown v. Sigler, 186 Neb. 800, 186 N. W. 2d 735 (1971): 8tate v. 
Ilolmes, 109 N . .T. Super. 180, 2fi2 A. 2d 725 (1970); PcoJ)lc e.r rel. 
JI enechino v. TV arde11. 27 N. Y. 2d 376, 267 N. E. 2d 238, 31S 
K. Y. S. 2d 449 (1971); Murray v. Page, 429 F. 2d 1:~5Q (C:\10 
1970) (Oklahoma) (10th Cir. abo inclml0~ W:,oming): Beardcm 
v. South Carolina, 443 F. 2d 1090 (CA4 1971) (4th Cir. also inclucfes 
N'orth Carolina and Virp;inia); Beal v. Truner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 
P. 2d 624 (1969); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (ED Wis. 
1971). Nine States arc affected by no legal requirement to grant any 
kind of hearing. 
~~ 
/.,./,. .._ r...,-.,l 1 
1/1,~-
~~ 
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Counsel or the help of a friend or a staff counselor 
or case workers should be permitted,1 a but we do not 
decide that the State is re uir rnish ~uch assi';t: 
i:wce.11 The issues in a parole revocation are not con-
plex; no significant legal questions normally arise. 
We have no thought to create an inflexible structure 
for parole revocation procedures. The few basic re-
quirements set out above should not impose a great 
burden on any State's parole system. Control over the 
required proceedings by the hearing officers can assure 
that delaying tactics and other abuses sometimes pre-
sent in the traditional adversary trial situation do not 
occur. Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues de-
termined against him in other forums, such as is pre-
sented when the revocation is based on conviction of 
another crime. 
In the peculiar posture of this case, given the absence 
of an adequate record, we conclude the ends of justice 
will be best served by remanding the cases to the Court 
of Appeals for their return to the District Court with 
directions to make findings on the procedures actually 
followed by the Parole Board in these two revocations. 
If it is determined that petitioners admitted parole vio-
lations to the Parole Board, as Iowa contends, and if 
ia The Model Penni Code § 305.16 (Proposed Offirial Draft 1962) 
provide,; that "The institutional parole staff slrnll render reasonable 
a id t.o the parolee in preparation for the hearing and he shall be 
permitted to advise with his own legal counsel. 
17 From 1ime to time it is suggest.rd that every institution have 
a "legal aid" or "prisoner aide" staff member qualified to al',ist 
pri;;onern in t.hesc situations. In all likelihood,, the experimental 
projects in this field will lead Sta1 cs to try ]lroviding such as;,;i~tance, 
and perhaps they will find that this soh·es some problem~ t ha.t 
plague correctional in.·tilutions. At this stage there i:,; inHufficicnt 
empirical dat:1 to ii;uide a, conclusion whether due JlI'OCC~s require;,; 
roun~el or o1hcr as::<istance in all such cases. 
J8 
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those violations are found to be reasonable grounds 
for revoking parole under state standards, that would 
end tho matter. If the procedures followed by tho 
Parole Board are found to meet tho standards laid down 
in this opinion that, too, would dispose of the due process 
claims for these cases. 
C 
' - - "\ 
·-' · 
We remand to the Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Rem.anded. 
